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11 Introduction
In the 2000’s, services sector in transition countries experienced rapid development due to
major regulatory changes. Deregulation allowed new ﬁrms to enter the market resulting in
rapid expansion of services as a share of GDP. The focus of this paper is on analyzing the
impact of those changes on productivity of manufacturing ﬁrms. This question has recently
received considerable attention due to the importance of services in the global economy and
due to the ongoing debates on the Doha Agenda (Hoekman et al., 2010). The literature
documents a positive eﬀect of services deregulation on productivity of manufacturing ﬁrms
in the Czech Republic (Arnold et al., 2011) and in Chile (Fernandes and Paunov, 2011). Still,
as pointed out by Francois and Hoekman (2010), works that try to establish a causal link
from services to increase in productivity are plagued with the endogeneity problem and with
the problem of disentangling the eﬀect of services liberalization reform from the eﬀect of other
reforms. We look at the episode of services liberalization in Ukraine in 2001-2007, which was
isolated from other major deregulatory changes and was driven by political pressure imposed
by trading partners as a precondition for the Ukrainian WTO accession.
We exploit rich data on Ukrainian manufacturing ﬁrms, which allows us to construct
a ﬁrm-speciﬁc index of the services use intensity and interact it with sub-sector and time-
varying indices of services liberalization provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD). We adopt the standard two-stage approach in the literature of
estimating the eﬀect of a policy change on productivity (Pavcnik, 2002; Javorcik, 2004; Amiti
and Konings, 2007; Khandelwal and Topalova, 2011). At the ﬁrst stage, we estimate the
production function using the Olley-Pakes methodology (Olley and Pakes, 1996), controlling
for demand shocks as suggested by De Loecker (2011), to extract total factor productivity
(TFP) of manufacturing ﬁrms. At the second stage, we regress TFP on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
index of services liberalization, controlling for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity and market
structure of manufacturing industries. As a new contribution, we also implement a one-
stage procedure of estimating the eﬀect of the services liberalization on productivity, which
2takes into account a dynamic eﬀect of liberalization on investment decisions and, as a result,
on exit and entry of ﬁrms.
Using the standard method, we ﬁnd that a standard deviation increase in our measure
of services liberalization is associated with a 9 percent increase in productivity. The size of
the eﬀect is stronger then in previous studies, probably reﬂecting the fact that the Ukrainian
services sector before the reform was less developed than in the Czech Republic and Chile.
The eﬀect is stronger for domestic and small ﬁrms, which makes services liberalization a
very useful tool for local policymakers interested in promoting growth of domestic small and
medium enterprises. Allowing for the dynamic eﬀect of services liberalization on current
investment decisions and on future productivity further reinforces the eﬀect of services lib-
eralization on productivity in manufacturing industries. We also document the uniformly
positive but heterogeneous in size impact of the reform across manufacturing industries.
We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of the reform is stronger for more aggregated data, reﬂecting
the two sources of increase in productivity at the industry level. First, the reform increases
within ﬁrm productivity as described in the previous paragraph. Second, the reform leads
to exit of low productivity ﬁrms and induces entrance of new competitors due to the general
equilibrium eﬀect of liberalization (see Olley and Pakes, 1996; Melitz, 2003), which further
increases industry productivity.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 places this study within the existing
literature. Section 3 describes progress of the services sector liberalization in Ukraine in
2001-2007 and its impact on the services sector. Section 4 discusses data, methodology and
results. Section 5 concludes.
32 Services liberalization and productivity in manufactur-
ing
Competitiveness of manufacturing ﬁrms in open economy hinges on availability of low-cost,
high-quality producer services (Francois and Hoekman, 2010). Literature mentions several
theoretical links from services liberalization to growth in productivity. Increased special-
ization of producer services leads to gains from trade in services due to increased variety
and expanded markets (Markusen, 1989). Lower price, better quality, and wider choice
of services allow more complex organization of a manufacturing ﬁrm through further frag-
mentation of production activities. In turn, fragmentation of production requires support
from internationally competitive transportation, communication, professional and ﬁnancial
services providers (Deardorﬀ, 2001). Higher variety of services also generates knowledge,
increase its diﬀusion and exchange (Burgess and Venables, 2004). Outsourcing of services
by productive ﬁrms in non-stagnant sectors results in more eﬃcient factor allocation that
expands output and production (Oulton, 2001).
Since services are often a ’margin’ sector, characterized by network externalities, strin-
gent regulations, and barriers to entry, the market power in services leads to loss in com-
petitiveness of the economy as a whole and requires services deregulation. Such services as
transportation, insurance, professional, or ﬁnancial services play a very important role in de-
termining the export competitiveness of manufacturing ﬁrms. In turn, expansion of exports
due to lower price margins in services could increase productivity through economies of scale.
Importantly, trade liberalization without services liberalization lowers the competitiveness
of domestic ﬁrms and causes their exit, which leads to negative employment dynamics in the
short run (Francois and Hoekman, 2010). Competition and further specialization in profes-
sional services could reduce transaction and contracting costs, which are quite substantial.
Lower transaction costs, in turn, encourage more outsourcing activities and arms-length
trade (Williamson, 1973).
4Mounting empirical evidence shows a positive impact of services deregulation on pro-
ductivity in downstream manufacturing industries. Arnold et al. (2011) establish a positive
link between TFP of manufacturing ﬁrms and liberalization of the services sector by an-
alyzing the impact of liberalization of services on the performance of approximately ten
thousand manufacturing ﬁrms in the Czech Republic in 1998-2003. The link is stronger for
the ﬁrms that use services inputs more intensively. A standard deviation increase in the
foreign presence in services is associated with a 3.8 percent increase in TFP. Fernandes and
Paunov (2011) ﬁnd that forward linkages from foreign direct investment in services to down-
stream manufacturing industries account for almost 5 percent of the observed increase in the
Chilean manufacturing productivity growth. Deregulation and liberalization policies that
increase competition among intermediate services providers are linked to increased export
competitiveness for high-tech industries (Fink et al., 2005).
Despite an unambiguously positive link between deregulation of services and manufactur-
ing productivity, the endogeneity of services sector reforms makes it diﬃcult to demonstrate
that there is a direct causal eﬀect of policy changes in services on productivity. For example,
as pointed out by Francois and Hoekman (2010), the liberalization of the services sector in
Eastern Europe coincided with a broad range of reforms carried out as the prerequisite for
the EU accession. As a result, it is very diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀect of a particular
reform that was a part of the broader reform package. With this regard, investigation of
liberalization of services in Ukraine brings some advantages because the reform package was
very limited and the eﬀect of the EU integration was not present.
3 Services liberalization in Ukraine
3.1 Services sector in Ukraine
The services sector has been generally neglected under central planning (Ofer, 1973). Overem-
phasis on the accelerated development of the producer goods industry, as the main driver
5of economic growth, led to crowding out of investment in services connected to ﬁnal con-
sumption (retail trade, hotels and restaurants, personal services). Organization of central
planning and abolishing of private ownership of productive assets resulted in underdevel-
opment in wholesale trade, ﬁnancial and business services. For instance, the state-owned
banking system and central planning of investment decisions resulted in only 1 percent of
employment allocated to banking and insurance (Bićanić and Škreb, 1991).
Transition from the centrally-planned to market-based economic system required a larger
and better developed services sector, which has been growing quite impressively. Figure 1
reports the dynamics of the services sector and ﬁnancial and business sub-sector as a share
of GDP of Ukraine in 1991-2009. By 2007, the share of services in the Ukrainian GDP
had reached 42 percent. Still, the share was well below the average for the middle income
countries, which was equal to 60 percent in 2007 (Francois and Hoekman, 2010) and much
lower than the average for the EU countries, which had reached 65.5 percent in 20071.
The whole period could be split into two sub-periods. Ukraine had entered its inde-
pendence in 1991 with a share of services to GDP of 20.5 percent, with only 5.5 percent
attributed to ﬁnancial and business services. In the ﬁrst decade since independence, the
services sector grew primarily due to expansion of telecommunication, retail and wholesale
trade sub-sectors. Between 1991 and 2000, the share of ﬁnancial and business services in-
creased only marginally. Between 2001 and 2009, on the other hand, ﬁnancial and business
services expanded from 6.7 to 18.8 percent of GDP.
3.2 Liberalization of the Ukrainian services sector in 2001-2007
Liberalization of the services sector in Ukraine, ﬁrst and foremost is linked to the WTO
accession negotiations. Ukraine applied for accession on 30 November, 1993. The major
obstacle on the way to the WTO accession was to bring the national legislation in compliance
with the WTO rules and regulations. However, not much had been done till 2001, when
1The WTO database on services reports the proﬁle of the EU services sector in 2007.
6Figure 1: Evolution of services in Ukraine in 1991-2009
Notes: Data from the the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database provided by the
UN.
President L. Kuchma “instructed his government to speed up all technical work related
to accession negotiations”2. The favorable political situation – the coalition government
had the majority in the Parliament – allowed it to pass more than 20 new laws related to
harmonization of the national laws and regulations with the WTO requirements in 2001-
2003. Concerning services, the government developed new laws and amended existing ones
that regulate activities of TV and broadcasting, information agencies, banks and banking
activities, insurance, telecommunications, and business services.
In telecommunication services, “Law on Telecommunications” of November 2003 provided
the possibility for any legal person in Ukraine to operate, service or own telecommunications
networks. A National Committee for Communication Regulation (NCCR), established ac-
cording to the law, became the regulatory authority in telecommunications which made the
2Report of the working party on the accession of Ukraine to the world trade organization, 25 January
2008, WT/ACC/UKR/152
7sector more transparent and open to competition. The law declared principles of equal access
and fair competition; introduced the policy towards standardization and harmonization with
the world standards; speciﬁed detailed procedures for frequency auctions and rules for licens-
ing. The ﬁnancial sub-sector has experienced a steady liberalization. In 2006, an amendment
to the law “On Banks and Banking” permitted foreign banks to open branches in Ukraine,
simpliﬁed the procedure for opening of banks and subsidiaries, and clearly deﬁned under
which circumstances the National Bank of Ukraine can turn down the application by the
foreign bank to operate in Ukraine. The law also deﬁned limiting terms for accreditation
of the foreign banks (up to 3 months). A sequence of amendments to the law on insurance
substantially liberalized the insurance sub-sector. In professional services, the laws “On au-
diting” and “On Bar” have been amended to remove the nationality requirements. The law
on auditing allowed the competition from foreign services providers.
The evidence on legislative improvements in the services sector regulations is supported by
improvements in EBRD indices of services. According to Figure 2, reporting the progress of
Ukraine in reforms of the services sub-sectors, Ukraine has substantially liberalized services in
a number of the services sub-sectors. The market access has been improved and the barriers
to entry considerably reduced in ﬁnancial, telecommunication, and business services.
The legislative eﬀort leveled the playing ﬁeld for local and foreign services providers,
improved market access, and made laws and regulations more transparent. The progress to
a large extent was exogenously imposed on the Ukrainian government by external economic
agents as a prerequisite to the WTO accession. There was no similar progress in equally
important infrastructure, utilities, and transport, hotels and restaurants sub-sectors, for
which no demand for improved market access had been made. A noticeable exception that
illustrates the rule was the process of harmonization of rail transportation tariﬀs that began
in April 2005 after some WTO members asked Ukraine to apply railway tariﬀs in conformity
with the WTO obligations. By June 2007, railway tariﬀs for most commodities had been
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Figure 2: Services sub-sectors liberalization in Ukraine in 2000-2009
9utilities in 2005-2010 was accepted in 2004. The program foresaw dissolution of monopolies
operating in the utilities sub-sectors in the long run, but the actual progress of the de-
monopolization has been very limited.
In parallel with the services liberalization, the WTO negotiations also led to further
liberalization of trade in goods. As mentioned earlier, it could have created a problem of
disentangling the eﬀects of services liberalization on productivity from the eﬀect of trade lib-
eralization, which is positively linked to an increase in productivity in the literature (Pavcnik,
2002; Amiti and Konings, 2007; Khandelwal and Topalova, 2011). However, by 2001 Ukraine
had already substantially liberalized its trade in goods. The average MFN tariﬀ of Ukraine
in 2002 was 7 percent and declined to 4.7 percent in 20083. The view that the eﬀect of trade
liberalization for Ukraine had a limited impact can be further backed by the results of a
computable general equilibrium analysis of the potential gains of WTO accession provided
by Rutherford et al. (2005), who concluded that more than 70 percent of welfare gains of the
WTO accession for Russia – a country similar to Ukraine in many respects – would come
from liberalization of services. Taking into account the similarities of the two economies and
the fact that Russia is less trade-liberalized relative to Ukraine4, it is reasonable to assume
that the eﬀect of services liberalization for Ukraine was even more pronounced. Still, in the
empirical analysis we control for the eﬀect of exporting on productivity and interact it with
the eﬀect of services liberalization to control for potential complementarities.
3.3 Performance of services in 2001-2007
Liberalization of the Ukrainian services sector in 2001-2007 was accompanied by increased
share of output produced by private and foreign-owned ﬁrms. The privatization process
was limited by the fact that, by 2001, most services sub-sectors in Ukraine already had a
high share of output produced by private ﬁrms, including more than 90 percent of output
produced by private ﬁrms in the retail trade, ﬁnancial, insurance, and business services sub-
3Data on MFN tariﬀs are from UNCTAD - TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) database.
4The average Russian MFN tariﬀ in 2002 was 9.6 percent.
10Figure 3: FDI stock in Ukraine in 2001-2007
sectors. Utilities, land transport, and supporting transport activities sub-sectors, on the
other hand, were largely state-owned in 2001 and remained state-owned in 2007. The period
has been characterized by a surge of FDI in the services sector. Figure 3 shows that in 2001,
48 percent of inward FDI stock in Ukraine was in manufacturing. By 2007, the share of FDI
stock in the services sector (excluding utilities) had reached 53 percent, while the share of
FDI stock in manufacturing had declined to 30 percent. As a result, the output produced
by foreign-owned services providers5 has been growing in almost all services sub-sectors,
increasing from 5 percent of services sector output in 2001 to 11 percent in 2007.
Labor productivity in the services sector more than doubled between 2001 and 2007.
What factors correlate with productivity of services ﬁrms? Table 1 reports labor productivity
“premia” for services sector ﬁrms depending on size, ownership, exporter status, sub-sector,
5Foreign-owned services providers are deﬁned as ﬁrms with at least 10 percent of foreign ownership.
11and year. The table reports the point estimates of the coeﬃcients of the following regression
ln(Yit=Lit) =  +   FDIshareit + 
  Exporterit+
+   ln(Lit) + Dj + #Dt + Dr + it (1)
where Yit is value added of services sector ﬁrm i in year t deﬂated by the sub-sector speciﬁc
price deﬂator, Lit is the ﬁrm’s employment, FDIshareit is the share of the equity owned by
foreigners, Exporterit is the dummy variable taking one if the ﬁrm exports and zero otherwise,
and Dj, Dt, and Dr are sub-sector, time, and region ﬁxed eﬀects. The regression is estimated
by ordinary least squares; signiﬁcance levels are reported based on robust standard errors.
Large services sector ﬁrms with foreign ownership and export activities have the highest
labor productivity. Elasticity of labor productivity with respect to size is 0.11. Firms with
10 percent higher foreign ownership are also 9.2 percent more productive. Exporting services
ﬁrms have 206 percent higher value added per worker. There is substantial heterogeneity of
services ﬁrms across sub-sectors. For instance, post and telecommunications are three times
more productive, while air transport is 77 percent more productive than the electricity, gas,
and steam sub-sector.
The evidence on opening up of services to foreign competition and on improvement in
performance of services providers supports our claim about substantial regulatory changes
in the Ukrainian services sector and give us a source of variation in the services sector to
analyze the impact of the deregulation on performance of manufacturing ﬁrms. The rest of
the paper analyzes this question in more detail.
12Variable Coeﬃcient Variable Coeﬃcient
ln(Employment) 0.11** Insurance 1.06**
FDI share [0,1] 0.92** Auxiliary ﬁn. activities 0.40**
Exporter, Yes=1 1.12** Real estate activities 0.19**
Sub-Sector. Base = Electricity, gas, and steam Renting of equipment 0.43**
Water -1.03** IT 0.50**
Sale of motor vehicles 1.59** R & D 0.14**
Retail trade 1.13** Other services 0.42**
Hotels and restaurants -0.39** Year, Base = 2001
Land transport 0.10** 2002 0.12**
Water transport 1.03** 2003 0.23**
Air transport 0.57** 2004 0.38**
Auxiliary transp. activities 0.78** 2005 0.52**
Post & telecom 1.12** 2006 0.62**
Financial intermediation 0.83** 2007 0.72**
N=501797
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01
Notes: Table reports labor productivity premium conditional on size, foreign ownership, sub-sector, and year. Regional ﬁxed
eﬀects are included but not reported. Results are based on OLS regression with robust standard errors. The dependent variable
is log of value added per worker deﬂated by sub-sector speciﬁc price deﬂator.
Table 1: Labor productivity premium depending on ﬁrm ownership, export status, sub-
sector, and year
4 Data, methodology, and results
4.1 Sample
The data for the study come from several statistical statements annually submitted to the
National Statistics Oﬃce (Derzhkomstat) by all commercial ﬁrms in the country. The data
are restricted and not available for public use. The sample covers seven years from 2001
to 2007. The total number of ﬁrms in the data set exceeds 400,000 per year and covers
all sectors except budgetary organizations (public schools, public hospitals, museums, etc.)
and banks. We start with the sample of manufacturing ﬁrms (NACE Section “D”) which
never switched to another sector over the period of study. Since the Sectoral Expenditures
Statement, required to construct the ﬁrm-speciﬁc service liberalization index, is submitted
by only relatively large ﬁrms, our sample is restricted to the ﬁrms with more than 150
employees on average. We further excluded observations with zero or negative output, capital
stock or employment assuming that they indicated non-operational ﬁrms in a year. Based
13on the ﬁles accompanying the Enterprise Performance Statement and the Balance Sheet
Statement, we have created a comprehensive proﬁle for every ﬁrm which includes the industry
(KVED/NACE) and territory codes, as well as exporting status in every year which were
used as controls. The industry codes were used to assign manufacturing ﬁrms into one of
eleven sub-industries. In every sub-industry, we cut oﬀ the top 1 percentile of the sample
(measured by employment, capital and output) to exclude outliers.
As the measure of output, we used net sales after excise taxes from the Financial Results
Statement. The Balance Sheet Statement is the source of the capital measure for which we
used the end-of-year value of the tangible assets. For the production function estimation we
used investments in tangible assets which come from the Enterprise Performance Statement.
The same statement is also a source for our employment variable. It is measured as the “year-
averaged number of enlisted employees”, which is a rough estimate of the full time equivalent
of labor used. The material costs come from the same statement in 2001-2004, whereas
since 2005 they have been available from a separate Sectoral Expenditures Statement. The
statement provides detailed information about the ﬁrm’s expenditures on purchases from
22 manufacturing sectors and 15 service sectors. Data from this statement were used to
construct an individual ﬁrm-speciﬁc index of services liberalization as we explain in the
Appendix. All variables were deﬂated by the appropriate price deﬂators available from the
National Statistical Oﬃce. The descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table
2.
4.2 Methodology
Following an insight from Rajan and Zingales (1998), who use variation in industries’ ﬁnan-
cial dependency and countries’ ﬁnancial development to investigate the eﬀect of ﬁnancial
liberalization on economic growth, several recent papers adopted this idea to investigate ef-
fects of trade (Amiti and Konings, 2007; Pavcnik, 2002; Khandelwal and Topalova, 2011) and
14Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
R,thd.hryvnas 40440 8001.91 16948.02 0.08 548158.70
L, workers 40440 171.57 265.52 1 6779
K,thd.hryvnas 40440 3111.47 6964.35 0.07 183732.00
M,thd.hryvnas 40440 6971.82 17583.37 0.1 706991.3
I,thd.hryvnas 30357 693.39 2112.28 0 89370.69
Serv. Lib. 40440 0.36 0.57 0 4.85
Serv. Lib. (FDI) 40440 0.34 0.64 0 29.31
Exporter, Yes=1 40440 0.34 0.47 0 1
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
services (Arnold et al., 2011; Fernandes and Paunov, 2011) liberalization on productivity.
We follow a similar identiﬁcation strategy. The strategy relies on the assumption that manu-
facturing ﬁrms that use services more intensively gain more from services liberalization. For
each period t, we construct a ﬁrm-speciﬁc index of services liberalization by interacting a sub-
sector-speciﬁc index of services liberalization with ﬁrm- and sub-sector-speciﬁc intensity of
services use. We further look at the within ﬁrm variation in TFP and relate it to the changes
in the ﬁrm-speciﬁc index of services liberalization. To recover the TFP measure, we estimate
the production function for each manufacturing industry (1-digit NACE classiﬁcation) by the
Olley-Pakes procedure (Olley and Pakes, 1996), controlling for sub-industry-speciﬁc demand
and price shocks as suggested by De Loecker (2011). We identify demand and price shocks
by exploiting variation in sub-industry (4-digit NACE classiﬁcation) output at time t and
by controlling for sub-industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Under the constant elasticity of sub-
stitution (CES) demand system, unobserved prices are picked up by the variation in inputs
and by aggregate demand and do not reﬂect diﬀerences in technology within an industry.
If this assumption fails, we still are able to estimate the impact of services liberalization on
productivity because our identiﬁcation strategy relies on within ﬁrm variation in services
intensity and time invariant diﬀerences in technology are not important.
15Technology and market structure








it exp(~ !it + ~ uit); (2)
where Yit units of real output are produced using Lit units of labor, Kit units of capital,
deﬂated by producer-price deﬂator, and Mit units of material and services inputs. Since
we have a breakdown of inputs by sector, each component of Mit is deﬂated by the corre-
sponding sector-speciﬁc price deﬂator. ~ !it is ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity, unobservable by an
econometrician, but known to the ﬁrm before it chooses variable inputs. ~ uit is idiosyncratic
shock to production that also captures measurement error. Yit is not observable, because
we do not observe ﬁrm-speciﬁc prices, pit, but sales, Rit = pitYit, are known. Use of Rit as
the dependent variable in estimation of production function parameters, without controlling
for prices, determined among other things by market structure and demand shocks, would
bias estimates of the production function if prices are correlated with inputs. Even more
importantly, generating productivity estimates containing demand variation introduces a re-
lationship between services liberalization and measured productivity through the impact of
the liberalization on prices and demand.
To separate the direct eﬀect of services liberalization on productivity from the indirect







where Yst is total expenditures on goods produced by manufacturing industry s, in which ﬁrm
i operates. Pst is industry-wide price at time t. ~ it is demand shock which is not observed by
the ﬁrm when it chooses variable inputs in production. Assuming monopolistic competition,
this demand structure implies a constant mark-up price-setting rule, which depends on the











Substituting (2) into (4) and taking logs yields
rit = llit + kkit + mmit + syst + !it + it + uit; (5)
where rit = ln(Rit=Pst) is log of revenue deﬂated by corresponding industry price deﬂator,
and other lower-case letters represent upper-case variables in the log form. f = s+1
s f,
where f = fl;k;mg. The elasticity of substitution in industry s can be retrieved from
s =  1=s. Finally, !it = s+1
s ~ !it, it =   1
s
~ it, and uit = s+1
s ~ uit are error terms.
Estimation of production function
We estimate
rit = llit + kkit + mmit + sygt + !it + it + uit; (6)
separately, for each industry s, keeping in mind our ultimate goal of measuring TFP net of
price and demand shocks. In what follows we suppress index s for clarity of presentation.
Instead of using overall output of industry s we use more disaggregated sub-industry g
output, ygt, to add more variability to estimation of s. It is valid since we assume that the
elasticity of substitution is constant within the industry.
We decompose the overall demand shock into the following components
it = t + g + ~ it; (7)
where t is industry-speciﬁc shock common to all ﬁrms at time t, g is demand factor aﬀecting
only ﬁrms producing in sub-industry g, and ~ it is an idiosyncratic shock. Plugging in (7) in
17(6), we have
rit = llit + kkit + mmit + ygt + tDt + gDg + !it + "it (8)
where Dt = t is a shock common to all ﬁrms in the industry at time t and Dg is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if a ﬁrm i operates in sub-industry g and zero otherwise.
"it = ~ it + uit is the error term which is not correlated with inputs and productivity.
We estimate (8) by the Olley-Pakes methodology, which is described in the appendix.
The point estimates of the coeﬃcients of the production function are presented in Table 3.
Total factor productivity net of price and demand eﬀects is recovered as




We do not factor out sub-industry and time eﬀects because we control for those eﬀects
in the second stage of the estimation described in the next subsection.
4.3 Main results
Impact of services liberalization on TFP of manufacturing ﬁrms
The estimated TFP is further regressed on the index of services liberalization that is ﬁrm-
speciﬁc, reﬂecting the variation in ﬁrm-level intensity of usage of various services inputs.




aijt  indexjt (10)
where serv libit is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc index of services liberalization, aijt is the share of input
sourced from the services sub-sector j in the total input for a ﬁrm i at time t, and indexjt is
the EBRD measure of liberalization in the service sub-sector j at time t. Mapping from the
EBRD indices to services sub-sectors is described in the appendix.
The constructed index of services liberalization takes into account liberalization of services
18ln(K) ln(L) ln(M) ln(Y ) Firms N
K K L L M M s
Food and Tobacco 0.043* 0.043 0.204*** 0.204 0.751*** 0.752 0.001 2567 11253
(0.018) (0.014) (0.012) (0.024)
Textile and Leather 0.107*** 0.104 0.445*** 0.434 0.469*** 0.458 -0.025 816 3104
(0.029) (0.025) (0.019) (0.045)
Wood and Paper 0.052 0.064 0.154*** 0.189 0.712*** 0.876 0.187* 513 2025
(0.029) (0.026) (0.035) (0.090)
Printing 0.084*** 0.079 0.402*** 0.377 0.497*** 0.467 -0.065 848 3363
(0.023) (0.033) (0.021) (0.053)
Coke, chemistry 0.107** 0.118 0.156*** 0.172 0.697*** 0.767 0.091** 798 3662
plastics (0.036) (0.019) (0.027) (0.030)
Non-metallic minerals 0.041 0.040 0.170*** 0.166 0.784*** 0.764 -0.026 758 3269
(0.027) (0.021) (0.016) (0.042)
Metallurgy 0.074** 0.079 0.179*** 0.192 0.670*** 0.717 0.066 747 2999
(0.028) (0.030) (0.043) (0.035)
Machinery and 0.025 0.024 0.365*** 0.355 0.570*** 0.554 -0.029 1033 4291
equipment (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.030)
High-tech machinery 0.060 0.061 0.207*** 0.209 0.594*** 0.600 0.010 705 3111
(0.037) (0.032) (0.020) (0.055)
Vehicles and transport -0.015 -0.017 0.279*** 0.314 0.551*** 0.620 0.111* 305 1355
(0.050) (0.057) (0.051) (0.053)
Furniture and others 0.095* 0.090 0.312*** 0.294 0.536*** 0.505 -0.061 555 2159
(0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.075)
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Bootstrap standard errors are presented in parentheses. Table reports point
estimates of revenue function parameters,  and production function paramters  = s
s+1, where s =  1=s for Ukrainian
manufactruing ﬁrms for 2001-2007. Each row in the table represents Olley-Pakes estimation of production function for eleven
manufacturing industries, deﬁned according to NACE Revision 1 classiﬁcation. Each estimation is performed with year and
sub-industry dummies, which are not reported for brevity.
Table 3: Estimation of production function by Olley-Pakes procedure
19sub-sectors and weights more heavily services sub-sectors used by the ﬁrm i more intensively.
The assumption here is that the liberalization of the sub-sector used by the ﬁrm more
intensively is more important and has a larger impact on the ﬁrm’s performance. We control
for export status of the ﬁrm by including an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if
the ﬁrm i has exported at time t: We also control for industry-time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect to
take into account unobservable industry characteristics such as market structure, cost and
demand shocks, and technological changes. Finally, we include ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to
control for unobservable managerial abilities and other ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics that can
be correlated with intensity of services use and productivity. The estimated regression takes
the following parametric form
ln(TFPit) =  + serv libit + exporterit
 (11)
+ exporterit  serv libit + Di + Dst + it
where TFPit is ﬁrm i0s level of total factor productivity at time t, exporterit is the dummy
variable that takes the value of one if ﬁrm i exported in year t and zero otherwise, Di
are ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, and Dst are industry-time speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects capturing the
market structure of industry s, and industry-speciﬁc macroeconomic shocks at time t.
Results are presented in panel A of Table 4 in columns (1) - (3). In column (1), the
ln(TFP) estimated by the Olley-Pakes method is regressed on the index of services liberal-
ization, controlling for ﬁrm and industry-time ﬁxed eﬀects. Hence, we estimate within ﬁrm
eﬀect of liberalization on productivity, removing any impact of current market structure and
demand shocks within the industry. The coeﬃcient of the services liberalization is positive
and signiﬁcant. Increase in the index of services liberalization by a standard deviation is
associated with 9 percent increase in productivity. In column (2), we add the export status
of the ﬁrm to capture the fact that exporters are both more productive (see, for example,
Bernard et al., 2003) and use services more intensively in order to coordinate their overseas
20(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. Main results
Serv. lib. 0.135 0.137 0.127
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016)
Serv. lib. (FDI) 0.082 0.083 0.065
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020)
Exporter 0.100 0.091 0.098 0.083
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Serv. Lib.  Exporter 0.028
(0.025)
Serv. Lib. (FDI)  Exporter 0.049
(0.031)
Firms 11057 11057 11057 11057 11057 11057
N 40440 40440 40440 40440 40440 40440
R2 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.65 0.65
B. Main results. IV
Serv. lib. 0.153 0.155 0.144
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Serv. lib. (FDI) 0.106 0.108 0.099
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Exporter 0.100 0.089 0.100 0.091
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Serv. Lib.  Exporter 0.033
(0.028)
Serv. Lib. (FDI)  Exporter 0.027
(0.024)
Firms 11057 11057 11057 11057 11057 11057
N 40440 40440 40440 40440 40440 40440
R2 0.65 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(TFP) estimated by Olley-Pakes procedure. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Each estimation is performed with industry-time cross-eﬀects and ﬁrms’ ﬁxed eﬀects, which are not reported for brevity.
Table 4: Services liberalization and total factor productivity in Ukraine in 2001-2007.
21activities. Inclusion of the export status only marginally changes the point estimate of the
coeﬃcient of the services liberalization. At the same time, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms that change
their status from non-exporters to exporters are about 10 percent more productive relative
to ﬁrms that operate only domestically. In column (3), our preferred speciﬁcation, we add
an interaction between the exporter status and the services liberalization to see whether the
exporters respond diﬀerently to services liberalization as discussed in the literature (Dear-
dorﬀ, 2001; Francois and Woerz, 2008; Francois and Hoekman, 2010). We ﬁnd that exporters
additionally gain in TFP due to services liberalization, but the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
Alternative measure of services liberalization
The EBRD measure of services liberalization can be criticized for being subjective, because
the indices are based on experts’ judgment. To check whether the subjectivity drives the
result, we introduce an alternative measure of services sub-sector liberalization based on the
share of employment of services providers with foreign ownership in total employment in
the sub-sector6. This measure is outcome-based and it proxies the degree of openness of





aijt  FDIsharejt (12)
where serv lib(FDI)it is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc index of services liberalization, aijt is the share of
input sourced from service sub-sector j in the total input of ﬁrm i at time t, and FDIsharejt
is the share of labor of majority foreign-owned companies in sub-sector j at time t. The results
with the alternative measure of services liberalization are presented in columns (4) - (6) of
Table 4. In terms of the direction and signiﬁcance of the eﬀect of services liberalization,
the results are similar to the results with EBRD indices. A standard deviation increase in
the services liberalization measured by foreign presence is associated with an increase in
6A measure based on output produced by the foreign services providers gives very similar results.
22productivity by 5.5 percent. Arnold et al. (2011) ﬁnd that a standard deviation increase in
foreign presence in the services sectors in the Czech republic is associated with a 3.8 percent
increase in the productivity of manufacturing ﬁrms, which is in line with our ﬁndings.
Endogeneity issues
Industries may lobby the government to liberalize services. More productive ﬁrms that
are larger and better politically connected have a stronger inluence on the government’s
decision which services sub-sectors to liberalize. Hence, the positive link between services
liberalization and productivity may be due to reverse causality. To adress the concern, we
instrument indexjt and FDIsharejt by the log of the sub-sector speciﬁc outward services
FDI of the EU to the rest of the world, ln(FDIjt)7. The argument goes as follows. The EU
has been a major bilateral negotiator over the WTO accession of Ukraine. We expect that
the EU put more pressure on liberalization of those services sub-sectors in which there are
large FDI outﬂows from the EU. Results of the ﬁrst stage IV regression, presented in the
appendix, indicate the EU FDI outﬂows are good predictors for both the EBRD index of
liberalization and for the FDI share of employment.
In the second stage we replace our indices of services liberalization with the indices of
services liberalization instrumented with outward FDI in services sub-sectors and report the
results in panel B of Table 4.
4.4 Sub-sample results
We further test the robustness of our results by looking at sub-samples of data along the
time, ownership and size dimensions. The results are presented in Table 5.
7Data is available from Eurostat
23(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2001-2004 2005-2007 Domestic Foreign Small Large
Serv. lib. 0.146 0.115 0.131 0.151 0.167 0.102
(0.021) (0.028) (0.016) (0.082) (0.024) (0.019)
Exporter 0.113 0.031 0.084 0.125 0.086 0.075
(0.016) (0.021) (0.012) (0.055) (0.044) (0.011)
Serv. Lib.  Exporter 0.018 0.043 0.043 -0.056 0.145 0.019
(0.035) (0.049) (0.029) (0.082) (0.094) (0.024)
Firms 8813 8174 10444 948 5752 7290
N 25710 14730 37418 3022 12041 28399
R2 0.60 0.74 0.64 0.76 0.60 0.69
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(TFP) estimated by Olley-Pakes procedure. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Each estimation is performed with year dummies, industry-time cross-eﬀects, and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, which are not reported
for brevity. Column (1) is estimated for 2001-2004. Column (2) is estimated for 2005-2007. Column (3) is estimated for
domestic ﬁrms with share of FDI less than 10 percent. Column (4) is estimated for foreign-owned ﬁrms, with share of FDI
above 10 percent. Column (5) is estimated for ﬁrms with employment below 50 workers. Column (6) is estimated for ﬁrms
with employment 50 workers and above
Table 5: Results for diﬀerent sub-samples
Services liberalization before and after 2005
We split the sample into two sub-periods – 2001-2004 and 2005-2007 – to control for possible
eﬀect of the political regime switch, because Ukrainian governments before and after the
Orange revolution of 2005 represented interests of diﬀerent ﬁnancial and industrial groups.
Also, there was a constitutional reform that shifted political power from the president to the
Parliament. The ﬁrst period was characterized by a more coordinated legislative eﬀort be-
tween the president and the Parliament, but the privatization process was non-transparent,
resulting in poor investment climate8. In addition, the government has been indecisive on
the integration strategy for the country. There was a discussion on beneﬁts of EU vs. Com-
monwealth of Independent States (CIS) integration. The second period was characterized
by the surge of FDI due to improvements in investment climate and clearly-stated strategy
8Privatization of the Kryvorozhstal, Ukraine’s largest and most modern steelworks, illustrates the irreg-
ularities in pre-2005 privatization procedures. In 2004 it has been privatized for 800 million US dollars by
Ukrainian oligarchs Akhmetov and Pinchuk in an auction that left out international bidders due to highly
protectionist conditions of the tender. In 2005, the steelworks has been re-privatized by Arcelor Mittal for
4.8 billion US dollars.
24of integration into the EU structures. However, the legislative eﬀort has been stalled due to
less eﬀective coordination between the branches of government.
The results of the baseline regression for the two sub-periods, presented in columns (1)
and (2) of the table, indicate that the eﬀect of services liberalization on productivity was
positive and signiﬁcant in both sub-periods, ruling out the possibility that our main result
was driven by the shift in the political environment. We also can not reject the test that the
point estimates for the services liberalization were diﬀerent in the two sub-periods.
Ownership type
We further split the sample into domestic- and foreign-owned ﬁrms, deﬁning the foreign
ownership threshold at 10 percent . Since the foreign-owned ﬁrms often have better access
to services from the international services providers, we expect that the services liberalization
should have a smaller impact on them. The results are presented in columns (3) and (4) of
the table. Indeed, only the coeﬃcient of services liberalization for the domestic sub-sample
is signiﬁcant. However, it should be noted that the coeﬃcient for the foreign sub-sample is
still positive and large in size. The loss in signiﬁcance might be driven by a considerably
smaller sample size of the foreign-owned ﬁrms.
Firm size
Finally, we split the sample into small and large ﬁrms, deﬁning a small ﬁrm as a ﬁrm that
employs less than 50 workers. We expect the small ﬁrms gain more from the services liberal-
ization because larger ﬁrms can produce some services internally (i.e. having a transportation
or auditing departments), while small ﬁrms rely on external services providers more heavily.
The results, presented in columns (5) and (6) of the table, indicate that the eﬀect of the ser-
vices liberalization on the small ﬁrms is about 50 percent larger. The result has an important
policy implication that improved services encourage development of small and medium enter-
prises. A caveat to this conclusion is that small manufacturing ﬁrms are under-represented
25in our sample, because a considerable number of small manufacturing ﬁrms do not report
their use of services and are excluded from the sample.
4.5 Robustness checks
One-stage method with exit depending on TFP
The literature, while giving advantage to the two-stage procedure of estimating the impact
of policy change on TFP (Pavcnik, 2002; Amiti and Konings, 2007; Arnold et al., 2011), also
utilizes a one-step approach (Fernandes and Paunov, 2008; Javorcik, 2004). As pointed out
by De Loecker (2011), the standard two-stage procedure of estimating the impact of liberal-
ization on productivity implicitly assumes that services liberalization does not impact prices
and variable inputs in production, is not related to returns to scale. Even more importantly,
this approach does not allow liberalization to dynamically impact the evolution of produc-
tivity, which is crucial for the exit decision by the ﬁrm. However, the ﬁndings presented
in the previous subsections directly contradict these assumptions. In particular, increase in
contemporaneous TFP due to services liberalization induces higher capital accumulation due
to expectation of even higher TFP in the future. It also has an eﬀect on the exit decision.
To investigate how our results change if we allow services liberalization to interact with
variable inputs, investment, and exit, we implement a one-stage procedure that simultane-
ously estimates parameters of the production function and the eﬀect of services liberalization
on productivity. We introduce two possible channels of inﬂuence of liberalization on TFP
and exit. One of the channels comes from overall trade liberalization either due to selection
process (Melitz, 2003) or due to learning by exporting (De Loecker, 2007; Amiti and Konings,
2007). We control for this eﬀect by including the export status as one of the variables that
inﬂuences TFP either directly in the production function or indirectly through the selection
process. The second channel, the one we are focused on, is from services liberalization to
productivity.
We modify the model by changing the productivity process to depend on export status
26and services liberalization !it = ht(kit;iit;exportit;servlibit). This creates two eﬀects: a
contemporaneous eﬀect on current level of productivity and the dynamic eﬀect on future
productivity due to current investment decisions. While we capture the ﬁrst eﬀect in the
two-stage procedure, the dynamic eﬀect is ignored. The results of the one-stage estimation
by manufacturing industries is presented in panel B of Table 6 and compared with the
results of the two-stage procedure by industries, presented in panel A of the table. In
general, the one-stage procedure estimations of the eﬀect of services liberalization are higher
relative to the two-stage, which is an indication of the dynamic interaction of services and
export liberalization with productivity and choice of variable inputs. At the same time,
the one-stage procedure suﬀers from the fact that the services liberalization indicator is an
endogenous variable because it depends on the choice of services inputs. Therefore, these
results should be taken with care.
Industry level results and ﬁrm dynamics with exit depending on productivity
We expect that the eﬀect of services liberalization on industry level productivity should be
greater then the within eﬀect on ﬁrm level productivity. Additional channels of increase in
industry productivity work through exit of low productive ﬁrms and reallocation of capital,
labor, and materials towards more productive ﬁrms, which expand their output and boost
industry level productivity.
The services sector liberalization, which according to our results increases productivity
of ﬁrms that use services more intensively, shifts the TFP distribution within an industry
to the right. The size of the shift varies across ﬁrms – heavy services users gain more –
and is exogenous to the ﬁrm. Analyzing the eﬀect of the shift of productivity on exit and
entry of ﬁrms and distribution of ﬁrms within the industry in the framework of the Melitz
(2003) model brings the following conclusions: high productive ﬁrms that use services more
intensively expand their output, revenues, and proﬁts, while low productive ﬁrms exit the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Serv. Lib. 1.348* 0.446*** 0.133*
(0.483) (0.086) (0.061)
Exporter 3.114*** 0.294 0.094
(0.330) (0.223) (0.080)
Serv. Lib.  -1.241 -0.007 0.078
Exporter (0.558) (0.126) (0.078)
Industries 11 102 238
N 77 498 1574
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Notes: Dependent variable is ln(TFP) estimated by Olley-Pakes procedure. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Each estimation is performed with industry and time ﬁxed eﬀects which are not reported for brevity.
Table 7: Industry level results
productivity within the industry, which exceeds the eﬀect for a particular ﬁrm in the industry,
and to higher dispersion of output, revenues, and proﬁts.9
The industry productivity is deﬁned as output-weighted average TFP of ﬁrms operating
in the industry. The measure of TFP is taken from the baseline estimation of the production
function presented in Table 3. Figure 4 shows kernel densities of TFP for each manufacturing
industry in 2001 and 200610. The distribution has shifted to the right for Textile and Leather,
Printing, High-tech machinery, Vehicles and transport. At the same time, productivity has
shifted to the left in Food and tobacco, Wood and Paper, Coke, chemistry and plastics,
Non-metallic minerals, and Metallurgy.
Industry level regressions, presented in Table 7, conﬁrm our conjecture of large and pos-
itive impact of services liberalization on within industry productivity. Results are presented
for industry-level aggregation in column (1), NACE 2 digit aggregation in column (2), and
NACE 3 digit aggregation in column (3).
Finally, we estimate the eﬀect of productivity, capital, and liberalization on probability of
exit. We expect that services liberalization should encourage exit of low productive ﬁrms. We
9The analysis is almost identical to the analysis of trade liberalization presented by Melitz. The important
diﬀerence is that Melitz assumes that the distribution of productivity is constant over time, while we consider
the case when the distribution shifts exogenously.
10We have chosen TFP in 2006 rather than in 2007, because the sample of ﬁrms in 2007 is much smaller
and comparison of distributions in 2001 and 2007 might be misleading.
29Figure 4: TFP in 2001 and 2006
Notes: Figure presents kernel density of TFP in 2001 (dashed line) and in 2006 (solid line) by each industry









Serv:Lib:i;t 1  Exporteri;t 1 -0.020 0.063
(0.090) (0.134)
N 6300 8103
Log Likelihood -773 -1608
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 8: Exit
split the sample of ﬁrms according to their productivity into quartiles and report estimates
of probit for ﬁrms in the ﬁrst productivity quartile (low productive ﬁrms) and the fourth
productivity quartile (high productive ﬁrms) in Table 8. Indeed, low productive ﬁrms are
more likely to exit, when the services sector liberalizes. All other variables inﬂuence the
probability of exit in the expected direction. More productive ﬁrms and ﬁrms with more
capital are less likely to exit. Exporters are less likely to exit.
Alternative methods
There is inherent diﬃculty of and methodological debates on estimating the production
function (Ackerberg et al., 2005; Van Biesebroeck, 2007), which is the crucial element of our
empirical procedure. We try several alternative methods of estimation of the production
function to reassure the robustness of our results, presented in Table 9. The estimation
results of the two-stage Olley-Pakes procedure estimated on the pooled manufacturing sample
(columns (1) and (2) of the table) are compared with the estimation results by several other
methods. The one-stage Olley-Pakes procedure, analogous to the method presented in panel
B of Table 6, but estimated on the pooled manufacturing sample, is presented in column
(3). Similarly to the results by manufacturing industries, the one-stage method estimate
31of services liberalization is considerably larger relative to the two-stage method. A one
standard deviation increase in services liberalization is associated with 16 percent increase
in productivity. The one-stage Levinsohn-Petrin (Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) procedure,
which treats the selection of materials to infer unobserved productivity, is presented in column
(4). It also estimates the eﬀect of services liberalization to be higher relative to the two-
stage method. As results of OLS with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects in column (5) and the estimate
in ﬁrst diﬀerences in column (6) demonstrate, the much higher estimates of the eﬀect by
the one-stage OP and LP methods are not due to the inherent diﬀerences between the one-
and two-stage methods, but due to the dynamic eﬀects of services liberalization on exit and
entrance of ﬁrms through the eﬀect on future productivity. Finally, column (7) presents the
Blundell-Bond estimate of the services liberalization eﬀect (Blundell and Bond, 2000), which
is smaller but still positive and signiﬁcant.
32(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
OP 2 stage OP LP FE Dif BB
1st stage 2nd stage
Serv. Lib. 0.130*** 0.314*** 0.284*** 0.100*** 0.075*** 0.049***
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.008)
Exporter 0.075*** 0.117*** 0.097*** 0.097*** 0.095*** 0.085***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Serv. Lib  0.011 0.032 0.148*** 0.040 0.029 0.034**
Exporter (0.025) (0.031) (0.029) (0.024) (0.020) (0.012)
Revenue function parameters
ln(K) 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.134*** 0.027*** 0.035*** 0.029***
(0.008) (0.014) (0.020) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
ln(L) 0.272*** 0.229*** 0.242*** 0.398*** 0.414*** 0.378***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.010)
ln(M) 0.635*** 0.688*** 0.569*** 0.560*** 0.505*** 0.502***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.047) (0.013) (0.011) (0.004)
ln(Y ) 0.024* 0.022 0.023 0.048*** 0.033*** 0.065***
(0.011) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012)
ln(ri;t 1) 0.064***
(0.014)
Time Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time  Industry Yes
Firm Yes Yes
Firms 9411 11057 9411 11057
Obs. 41127 40440 41127 40440 40440 29041 32306
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Table reports point estimates of regression of ln(TFP) (column (2)) or ln(Sales)
(columns (3)-(7)) on services liberalization and export status, as well as revenue function parameters for Ukrainian manufacturing
ﬁrms for 2001-2007. Production function in all models is estimated for all manufacturing industries pooled in one regression.
Columns (1) and (2) are estimated by Olley-Pakes two-stage procedure. Column (3) is estimated by Olley-Pakes one-stage
procedure. Column (4) is estimated by Levinsohn-Petrin procedure. Column (5) is estimated by OLS with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects.
Column (6) is estimated by OLS in ﬁrst diﬀerences. Column (7) is estimated by Blundell-Bond. Standard errors, reported in
parentheses, are either bootstrapped for OP and LP methods, or robust for all other methods.
Table 9: Alternative methods
5 Conclusions
This paper ﬁnds that liberalization of services has a positive eﬀect on productivity of manu-
facturing ﬁrms. We consider an episode of a limited liberalization in Ukraine, which primarily
targeted the services sector as a prerequisite to the WTO accession. These particular fea-
tures of the episode allow to separate the eﬀect of services liberalization from the eﬀects of
33other reforms and to reduce concerns on the endogeneity of the reform. We pay particu-
lar attention to unbiased estimation of TFP by employing the Olley-Pakes methodology of
estimation of the production function with important innovations laid out in De Loecker
(2011). In addition, we compare one- and two-stage methods of estimation of the eﬀect of
liberalization and ﬁnd that the two-stage procedure biases the eﬀect of policy downwards by
failing to account for the eﬀect of the policy on exit and on the variable inputs mix.
According to more conservative results from the two-stage estimation procedure, a stan-
dard deviation increase in the services liberalization boosts the productivity by 9 percent.
An alternative measure of the services liberalization, based on FDI penetration in the ser-
vices sector, indicates that a standard deviation increase in the FDI based index is associated
with a 5.5 percent increase in productivity. The size of the eﬀect is higher than in other
studies (Arnold et al., 2011; Fernandes and Paunov, 2011), probably reﬂecting the fact that
the initial conditions in the services sector in Ukraine were much worse than in the Czech
Republic or Chile. The eﬀect is stronger for domestic ﬁrms and for small ﬁrms, which gives
policymakers a nice tool to support and develop small and medium size domestic enterprises.
Another important ﬁnding is much stronger estimates of the eﬀect by the one-stage
method. It shows that the services liberalization has an important eﬀect on exit decision
and on dynamics of TFP through its impact on investment decisions. This conclusion is
supported by the fact that the eﬀect of services liberalization is stronger at the industry level
and the exit decision of low productive ﬁrms strongly depends on our measure of services
liberalization. However, the one-stage method introduces the endogeneity problem which is
not resolved in this paper. We leave this task for future research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Olley-Pakes procedure
Unobserved productivity follows an exogenous ﬁrst order Markov process p(!itjIit) = p(!itj!it 1),
where Iit is the ﬁrms information set at time t. Capital accumulated by ﬁrms is determined
as kit = kit 1(1 )+iit 1, where i is log of investment. Solving a dynamic problem of proﬁt
maximization yields the following investment function
iit = it(kt;!it): (13)
37Assuming (13) is strictly increasing in !it, we invert it to generate
!it = ht(kit;iit): (14)
Substituting (14) into (8) yields
rit = llit + mmit + g(kit;iit) + ygt + tDt + gDg + ~ uit; (15)
where
g(kit;iit) = kkit + ht(kit;iit):
Clearly, k can not be identiﬁed from (15), but l and m are identiﬁed, using a third-
order polynomial approximation of g(kit;iit). The capital coeﬃcient is further identiﬁed
from
E[ritjIt;it = 1] = llit + kkit + mmit + ygt + tDt + gDg +  (it;!it 1)
or
rit = E[ritjIt;it = 1] + eit: (16)
where we preliminary estimate the survival probability, it = 1, given by
Prfit = 1j!it(kit);Iit 1g = '(kit 1;iit 1) = it
and approximate  (it;!it 1), using predicted probability of survival c it and a third









* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Table 10: IV. First stage
6.2 IV ﬁrst stage
We regress our services sub-sector speciﬁc indicators of liberalization indexjt and FDIsharejt
on the log of services sub-sector speciﬁc ourward FDI from the EU towards the rest of the
world, ln(FDIjt). The results are presented in Table 10.
We further construct serv libit =
P
j aijtindexjt and serv lib(FDI)it =
P
j aijtFDIsharejt,
where indexjt and FDIsharejt are linear predictions taken from the ﬁrst stage regressions.
6.3 Mapping EBRD indices to services sub-sectors
We have constructed two indices of services liberalization: one that includes utilities and
retail trade and another that does not. All results in the paper are reported for the index
that includes transportation, telecom, ﬁnancial services, and business services. The results
for the index that includes utilities are very similar.
Index with utilities and retail trade
For eight services sub-sectors – Electricity, Gas, Water and water waste, Retail trade and
repair, Transport, Telecom, Finance, and Other business-related services (hotels and restau-
rants, real estate, rent, informatization, R&D, agencies) – we map the sub-sector with EBRD
indices of reforms as follows:
E: Electricity - (electric)
39E1: Gas (IER index: 2 all the time)
E2: Water and water waste (water)
G: Retail trade and repair
I: Transportation 1/2(rail + roads)
I1: Telecom (telecom)
J: Finance 1/2(banking + ﬁnancial )
H+K: Other business-related services (hotels and restaurants, real estate, rent, informa-
tization, R&D, agencies) 1/5( ssp + price_lib + trade_lib+ competition+ ﬁnancial)
Index without utilities and retail trade
For four services sub-sectors – Transport, Telecom, Finance, and Other business-related
services (hotels and restaurants, real estate, rent, informatization, R&D, agencies) – we map
the sub-sector with EBRD indices of reforms as follows:
I: Transportation 1/2(rail + roads)
I1: Telecom (telecom)
J: Finance 1/2(banking + ﬁnancial )
H+K: Other business-related services (hotels and restaurants, real estate, rent, informa-
tization, R&D, agencies) 1/5( ssp + price_lib + trade_lib+ competition+ ﬁnancial)
40